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DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE TAKEOVER
TECHNIQUES: CREEPING TENDER OFFERS,
LOCKUP ARRANGEMENTS, AND
STANDSTILL AGREEMENTS
Recent corporate history has witnessed an increase in corporate
takeover activity' and in the variety of techniques bidders employ to ac-
quire holdings in target companies.2 A wide array of federal and state
laws attempts to safeguard the investing public by requiring bidders to
disclose significant accumulations of target company stock and by impos-
ing substantive restrictions on the forms of corporate takeovers.3 Partly
to evade disclosure laws, bidders have turned increasingly to open
market and privately negotiated purchases to secure a foothold in a
target's stock before launching a formal tender offer.4 Some bidders
See Quade, Merger Volume Up, but No Mania Seen, 68 A.B.A.J. 31, 31 (1982). In
1981 the dollar volume of corporate takeovers reached a record high, with mergers totalling
more than $60 billion. See id. Corporate takeover activity historically increases during
periods when stock prices are undervalued. See Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory,
the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 5 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Fischel]. Companies with low market prices for their
securities often attract corporate bidders that anticipate higher profits under more efficient
management. See id. A recent trend, however, has been for large, cash-rich companies to
pursue takeover bids for small, well-managed firms in areas with the potential for continued
profitability and growth. See E. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER 100
(1981).
2 See Fischel, supra note 1, at 5. The takeover device bidders use often depends on
how receptive the target's management is to an acquisition attempt. See id. If the current
management favors the takeover, a bidder may seek to approach the target directly with a
merger proposal. See id. If the target management opposes the acquisition, a bidder may
choose to wage a proxy contest for corporate control or engage in direct purchases of target
shares. See id. at 6-7. A bidder may make direct purchases of target shares through private
negotiations with individual shareholders, through transactions on the open market, or pur-
suant to a tender offer. See id. at 5-6. The current trend in corporate takeovers is to employ
a combination of acquisition techniques in a multistep acquisition. See text accompanying
notes 6-14 infra.
See text accompanying notes 21-34, 71, 83-87 infra.
See Nathan, Developments in Strategies and Tactics for Offerors in Merger,
Tender Offer and Similar Acquisitions Transactions, in PLI, TENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
SECURITIES REGULATION 257, 266-67 (A. Fleischer, M. Lipton & R. Stevenson eds., 1979). A
"tender offer" generally is a public offer to purchase for cash, stock, or other consideration
some or all of the securities of a publicly held corporation during a fixed period of time at a
particular price or upon specified terms. See generally E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER
OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 70 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ARANOW & EINHORN]; Note,
What is a Tender Offer?, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 908 (1980) [hereinafter cited as What is a
Tender Offer?]; Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 34 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1251-52 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Developing
Meaning]; note 36 infra. The tender offer is the best means for acquiring a company with
widely held shares. See Fischel, supra note 1, at 6. In contrast to open market purchases in
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have succeeded in rendering the takeover a virtual fait accompli before
triggering disclosure requirements.'
Bidders now regularly include acquisition of a block of target shares
as the first step in a series of transactions known as a multistep
takeover.' The conventional multistep takeover consists of purchases of
target shares in the open market or through private negotiations,
followed by a tender offer8 and a merger. 9 By securing a large stake in
which the bidder has no control over the number of shares available, tender offers may be
conditioned upon obtaining sufficient shares for control. See id. Tender offerors typically
reserve the right to purchase any and all shares tendered but refuse to become bound
unless specified conditions are met. See Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership
and in Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearings on S.510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of
the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 211 (1967) (supplemental
memorandum of Securities and Exchange Commission) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Senate
Hearings]. Because the shareholder grants the offeror a conditional right to purchase the
tendered shares, the shareholder obligates himself to sell while the offeror remains uncom-
mitted. See id. In return for the tendered shares, the offeror usually pays cash but also may
exchange the target stock for the offeror's shares or offer a combination of both. See
Fischel, supra note 1, at 6. Target shareholders desiring to participate in a tender offer
tender their shares to an agent specified by the bidder. See Hearings on H.R. 14475 and
S.510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1968) (statement of Manuel F. Cohen,
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission) [hereinafter cited as 1968 House
Hearings]. The bidder provides a time period within which target shareholders must tender
their shares. See id. If the shareholders tender sufficient shares, the bidder must purchase
the shares at the tender offer price. See id. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(c) (1981). If the number of
shares tendered falls short, the bidder must either return the shares to the shareholders or
extend the tender offer time period. See 1968 House Hearings, supra at 11; 17 C.F.R. §
240.14e-l(d) (1981); note 71 infra.
I See Freund & Easton, The Three-Piece Suitor: An Alternative Approach to
Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 34 Bus. LAW. 1679, 1680 (1979) [hereinafter 8ited as
Freund & Easton].
' See Freund, The Multi-step Approach to Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, in
PLI, TENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 503, 504 (A. Fleischer & M. Lip-
ton eds., 1978) (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 285)
[hereinafter cited as Freund]. See generally Freund & Easton, supra note 5; Freund & Volk,
Tender Offers: Developments on Offense, in PLI, ELEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
SECURITIES REGULATION 1, 2-29 (A. Fleischer, M. Lipton & R. Stevenson eds. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Freund & Volk].
' See Freund, supra note 6, at 504-05. In seeking to obtain a block of target shares
before a tender offer, the bidder usually attempts to negotiate stock purchase agreements
with large individual or institutional investors of the target. See id. A bidder failing to ob-
tain sufficient shares privately may turn to the open market to purchase the shares through
a national security exchange or the over the counter market. See id. at 507.
' See id. at 506; note 4 supra. Because most target companies' shares are widely held,
a tender offer is usually a necessary part of a multistep acquisition to secure sufficient
shares to minimize the threat of competing bids. See Freund & Easton, supra note 5, at
1686. The second step of a multistep takeover is usually a "friendly" tender offer with the
target board of directors recommending the acceptance of the offer to its shareholders. See
id. at 1684.
' See Freund, supra note 6, at 506. The last step of a multistep takeover is ordinarily a
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the target stock before a tender offer, a bidder seeks to attain a better
position to approach the target management with its acquisition pro-
posal."0 If the target management is receptive to the acquisition, the
target company may be willing to protect the bidder from competing
bids by offering the bidder rights in the target's shares or assets or by
assuring the bidder of management support for a tender offer." The
target, however, may choose to reject the tender offer outright or at-
tempt to limit the bidder's acquisition of target shares.'" To attract a
more favorable bidder, the target may grant a preferred bidder rights in
the target stock or assets to promote the favored acquisition. 3
Three recent developments cast doubt on the continued viability of
techniques bidders use in multistep acquisitions. Attempts to subject
open market and privately negotiated purchases to the same disclosure
and substantive requirements applied to conventional tender offers may
restrict pre-tender offer acquisitions."' Additionally, courts holding that
stock purchase and option agreements between bidders and targets are
manipulative 5 may stall continued use of agreements intended to pro-
merger of the target with a shell subsidiary of the bidder. See id. If the first two steps yield
sufficient shares, a bidder may be able to take advantage of a short-form merger available in
most states. See id. at 522-23. A short-form merger is a merger between a parent company
and a subsidiary which does not require a vote of the subsidiary's shareholders. See Freund
& Easton, supra note 5, at 1684. Short-form mergers, however, require the bidder to acquire
a minimum number of shares before the merger can occur. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
253 (1974) (requiring 900/0 minimum for short-form merger); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 905
(McKinney 1963) (providing 95/o minimum for short-form merger). See Freund & Easton,
supra note 5, at 1684. If the bidder lacks the required minimum or if short-form mergers are
unavailable in the state, the bidder usually must pursue a conventional merger. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 903 (McKinney 1963); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.78 (Baldwin 1978).
See Freund, supra note 6, at 507.
"0 See Freund & Volk, supra note 6, at 5. By acquiring shares in a target company
before initiating a formal tender offer, a bidder can obtain a bargaining position with the
target's management, which may assure a more favorable reception for the bidder's acquisi-
tion proposals. See Law, Lipton & Flom, Takeover Bids: Recent Developments, PLI,
SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 181, 199-200 (R. Mundheim, A.
Fleischer & B. Vandergrift, eds. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Law, Lipton & Flom]. In addi-
tion, pretakeover purchases allow a bidder to test the market in the target stock to deter-
mine the pricing formula to be used in a formal tender offer. See id. A pre-tender offer ac-
cumulation of target shares can help dissuade others from joining the bidding for the target
company. See Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 826 n.25 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Gilson].
If another bidder vies for the target stock and tops the initial suitor's bid, the advance pur-
chases may insure that the first bidder still profits from the venture through the increased
price of the shares. See Law, Lipton & Flom, supra, at 199-200.
" See text accompanying notes 78-81 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 150-158 infra.
,I See text accompanying notes 78-81 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 37-72 infra.
,I See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 49, 53 (6th Cir.),
rev'g, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,375, at 92,262 (S.D. Ohio
1982] 1097
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tect favored acquisitions from competing bids."8 Similarly, concern that
limiting a bidder's rights in the target stock restricts shareholder
choice 7 may curtail the practice of negotiating agreements containing
such limitations. 8 Generally, tighter restrictions on pre-tender offer pur-
chases and closer judicial scrutiny of tender offer negotiations may slow
corporate takeover activity or at least restrict the acquisition techni-
ques available to bidders.
As the first step in a multistep acquisition, corporations often
preface their formal tender offers with open market or privately
negotiated stock purchases." The legal consequences of pretakeover
transactions may differ under federal and state law.20 State tender offer
statutes usually require disclosure of substantial stock accumulations
and impose substantive requirements on bidders attempting takeovers.2
Many state takeover laws, however, exempt from regulation acquisitions
1981); text accompanying notes 88-181 infra; Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc. v. Milgo Elec.
Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145, 1157-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
" See text accompanying notes 78-140 infra.
See Conoco Inc. v. Seagram Co., 517 F. Supp. 1299, 1303-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); text ac-
companying notes 159-92 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 150-98 infra.
9 See Gilson, supra note 10, at 871; text accompanying notes 6-10 supra.
' See Note, Securities Law and the Constitution: State Tender Offer Statutes Recon-
sidered, 88 YALE L.J. 510, 510-16 (1979) [hereinafter cited as State Tender Offer Statutes].
2 See id. at 514-16. Thirty-seven states have enacted takeover statutes that regulate
various aspects of corporate acquisitions. See Veasy, State Takeover Statutes, in PLI,
THIRTEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 179, 181-82 (A. Fleischer, M. Lip-
ton & R. Mundheim eds. 1981) (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
373) [hereinafter cited as Veasy]. Virtually all state takeover laws govern attempts to ac-
quire companies incorporated within the state, and the majority extend to acquisitions of
corporations with the principal place of business or significant assets within the state. See
E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL 234-36 (1977) (table listing jurisdictional requirements of state takeover statutes)
[hereinafter cited as ARANOW, EINHORN & BERLSTEIN]; State Tender Offer Statutes, supra
note 20, at 514-19, 514 n.29. Some state statutes require disclosure of essentially the same
information required to be disclosed under federal securities laws. See, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. § 11-51.5-104 (Supp. 1981) (required disclosure same as Williams Act); MD. CORP. &
ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-902 (Supp. 1981) (requiring same disclosures as Williams Act); State
Tender Offer Statutes, supra note 20, at 515; note 29 infra. Other state statutes demand
more complete disclosure. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1603 (McKinney Supp. 1981) (re-
quiring offeror to disclose capital structure, pending legal or administrative proceedings,
and financial statements); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(G)(3) (Baldwin 1978) (calling for
offeror to disclose capital structure, significant legal proceedings, and financial statements);
70 PA. STAT. ANN. § 75 (Purdon Supp. 1981) (providing for offeror to disclose capital struc-
ture, material legal or administrative proceedings, and financial statements); see Tender Of-
fer Statutes, supra note 20, at 56 n.36. Most states require filing of disclosures 20 days
before a tender offer. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(B) (Baldwin 1978). At least one
state, however, requires disclosure as early as 60 days before a tender offer. See HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 417E-3(f) (1976). Given the early warning required under state law, target
management usually has the opportunity to prepare defensive tactics in response to acquisi-
tion attempts. See ARANOW, EINHORN & BERLSTEIN, supra, at 217. Hence, takeover statutes
[Vol. 39:1095
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which the target board of directors approves.22 Because multistep trans-
actions involve negotiating a "friendly" takeover with the target
management, multistep acquisitions ordinarily would not be subject to
regulation under state takeover laws. 23
Under federal law significant stock accumulations are likely to trig-
ger the disclosure provisions of the Williams Act24 amendments to the
are subject to attack as protective of local business. See Gould & Jacobs, The Practical Ef-
fects of State Tender Offer Legislation, 23 N.Y.L. SCR. L. REV. 399, 402 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Gould & Jacobs].
Most state takeover statutes also provide for the state securities agency to review the
adequacy of the disclosure or the substantive fairness of any takeover bid should the agency
or target request a hearing. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-460 (1981) (hearing
available at request of securities commissioner, target company, or shareholder owning
10% of target shares); 70 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 74(d) (Purdon Supp. 1981) (hearing limited
to fairness of disclosure); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-4 (Supp. 1981) (allowing state securities
agency to review substantive fairness of offer). In addition to disclosure, some states impose
specific substantive requirements on the offeror. The acts often require minimum and max-
imum tender offer periods. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(2) (Supp. 1980) (20-day
minimum but no maximum period for tender offers); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.905(2)
(Supp. 1980) (60-day minimum tender offer period but no maximum period); see ARANOW,
EINHORN & BERLSTEIN, supra, at 214-15. The statutes also guarantee tendering shareholders
the right to withdraw their shares. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51.5-103(1)(c) (Supp. 1981)
(allowing withdrawal of tendered shares during first 15 days and after 35 days of commence-
ment of tender offer); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(3) (Supp. 1980) (permitting withdrawal
of tendered shares during first 20 days of tender offer); see ARANOW, EINHORN & BERLSTEIN,
supra, at 214-15.
Because courts and commentators often perceive state takeover laws merely as intended
to protect local business and incumbent management from outside takeover, state takeover
laws are vulnerable to attack as pre-empted both by the federal securities laws and the com-
merce clause of the United States Constitution. See Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181,
191 (3rd Cir. 1980) (New Jersey disclosure law pre-empted by federal law); Great West.
United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on grounds of venue sub nom.,
Leroy v. Great West. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979) (invalidating Idaho tender offer
statute on Williams Act and commerce clause grounds). See generally State Tender Offer
Statutes, supra note 20; Langevoort, State Tender Offer Legislation" Interests, Effects, and
Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 213 (1977); Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap:
State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1976).
1 See, e.g., GA. CODE § 22-1901(f)(2)(B) (1977); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 451.904(2)(d)
(Supp. 1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(A)(1)(d) (Baldwin 1978); see ARANOW, EINHORN
& BERLSTEIN, supra note 21, at 405-07.
See Freund & Volk, Developments on Offense, in PLI, ELEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE
ON SECURITIES REGULATION 13, 21-22 (A. Fleischer & M. Lipton eds. 1979) (PLI Corporate
Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 319) [hereinafter cited as Developments on Of-
fense]. Although multistep transactions may be exempt from state takeover laws in some
states, fiduciary standards apply in judging target management decisions in response to a
takeover. See note 195 infra.
2 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. II 1978) (adding §§ 13(d)-(e), 14(d)-(f) to
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act)). Congress enacted the Williams Act amend-
ments to the '34 Act in response to the increasing popularity of tender offers as a takeover
device. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2811-15 [hereinafter cited as 1968 House Rep. and paginated to
[1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811]. One reason for the upsurge in tender offers was
1982] 1099
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Securities Exchange Act of 19341 ('34 Act). Section 13(d) of the '34 Act 26
requires bidders acquiring beneficial ownership of five percent or more
of any class of equity securities registered under the '34 Act' to file with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) within ten days of the
acquisition a schedule 13D, 9 disclosing certain ownership informa-
that federal law allowed bidders to engage in corporate acquisitions without requiring bid-
ders to disclosure the takeover attempts. See id. at 2812. Congress enacted the Williams
Act to insure that target shareholders have access to material information concerning the
tender offer on which to base their investment decisions. See id. at 2813. Consistent with
the general scheme of federal securities laws, Congress deemed adequate and accurate
disclosure essential for shareholders to evaluate intelligently takeover proposals. See id.
See generally Brown, The Scope of the Williams Act and Its 1970 Amendments, 26 Bus.
LAW. 1637 (1971); Note, The Williams Amendments: An Evaluation of the Early Returns,
23 VAND. L. REV. 700 (1970).
' See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976). In addition to disclosure requirements, other
provisions of the '34 Act are likely to affect open market and privately negotiated purchases
in connection with multistep acquisitions. Section 16(b) of the '34 Act provides that a corp-
oration may recover profits from transactions in its securities within a six month period by
insiders or beneficial owners of 10% or more the company's stock. See id. § 78p(b) (1976). A
bidder failing to acquire enough securities to complete a takeover attempt may risk § 16(b)
liability if he resells the securities within six months. See id.; ARANOW & EINHORN, supra
note 4, at 257 n.120; Nathan, Lock-Ups and Leg-Ups: The Search for Security in the Ac-
quisitions Market Place, in PLI, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION
13, 37-38 (A. Fleischer, M. Lipton & R. Mundheim eds. 1981) (PLI Corporate Law & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 373) [hereinafter cited as Nathan]. Once a tender offer com-
mences, rule 10b-13 prohibits bidders from purchasing or entering into agreements to pur-
chase securities outside the tender offer. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1981); Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 8712 (Oct. 8, 1969). Most bidders execute stock purchase
agreements before commencing the tender offer to avoid the rule 10b-13 limitation. See
Nathan, supra, at 30-31.
Accumulations of 150/0 or more of a company's voting securities or an aggregate
amount exceeding $15 million also may trigger the disclosure provisions of the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976. See 15 U.S.C. § 18(a)(3) (1976). See generally S.
AXINN, B. FOGG & N. STOLL, ACQUISITIONS UNDER THE HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANTITRUST IM-
PROVEMENTS ACT (1980); Nathan, supra at 22-25. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act requires ad-
vance notice of significant stock accumulations to allow the opportunity for private enforce-
ment of the federal antitrust laws. See 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND
FREEZEOUTS 333 (1978). The practical effect of the statute is to delay corporate acquisitions
regardless of the likelihood of substantive antitrust problems. See id.
26 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
Id. Originally, the Williams Act required disclosure of beneficial ownership upon ac-
cumulation of 10% of any class of equity security. See id. §§ 78m(d) & 78n(d) (1972). In 1970,
however, Congress reduced the amount of shares needed to trigger the disclosure require-
ment from 10% to 5% to provide broader disclosure. See H.R. REP. No. 91-1655, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5025, 5026.
' See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976). Section 12 of the '34 Act requires corporations with
assets of at least $1 million and over 500 shareholders or any corporation with securities
traded on a national exchange to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). See id. § 781 (1976) ('34 Act, § 12).
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1981) (rule 13d-101). Schedule 13D requires disclosure of
the identity and background of the beneficial owner of stock, the source and amount of
financing for the transaction, the extent of the purchaser's holdings, and, if the purchaser in-
1100 [Vol. 39:1095
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tion.3 ° In contrast to section 13(d), which applies to all accumulations of
registered securities and allows disclosure after the acquisition,31 section
14(d) of the '34 Act only governs acquisitions in the form of tender offers
and requires disclosure of information about the bidder before the
offer.32 Before making a tender offer, a bidder must file a schedule
14D-133 with the SEC and publish or transmit the information the
schedule 14D-1 contains to the target shareholders.14 Consequently,
whether a bidder must disclose before or after a transaction depends on
whether the acquisition is characterized as a tender offer."
Because the Williams Act does not define the term "tender offer,"
courts have had to determine when a bidder's acquisitions constitute a
tender offer." Companies that have been the target of gradual accumula-
tends to acquire control, any plans the buyer has for the company. Id.
Section 13(d) of the '34 Act does not expressly provide a private cause of action for
failure to comply with the provisions. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976 & Supp. II 1978) ('34 Act,
§ 13(d)). Numerous courts, however, have been willing to imply a private right to action
under the section. See, e.g., General Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90, 94 n.5 (1st Cir.
1977); W. A. Krueger Co. v. Kirkpatrick, Pettis, Smith, Polian, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 800, 803 (D.
Neb. 1979); Myers v. American Leisure Time Enterpr., 402 F. Supp. 213, 214 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), affd mem., 538 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976). But see Gateway Indus., Inc. v. Agency Rent
A Car, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 92, 100 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Sta-Rite Industries, Inc. v. Nortek, Inc., 494
F. Supp. 358, 362 (E.D. Wis. 1980). See generally Comment, Private Right of Action for
Damages Under Section 13d), 32 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1980); Note, Section 13(d) of the '34 Act:
The Inference of a Private Cause of Action for a Stock Issuer, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 971
(1981).
1 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976 & Supp. II 1978); note 29 supra. In addition to filing a
schedule 13D with the SEC, the purchaser must send the information required in schedule
13D within 10 days of the purchase to each stock exchange listing the security and to the
issuer. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (1981) (rule 13d-1).
°' See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976 & Supp. H 1978).
Id. § 78n(d). Although § 14 contains no express private right of action, courts have
implied a private right to sue for injunctive relief under the section. See, e.g., Weeks Dredg-
ing & Contracting, Inc. v. American Dredging Co., 451 F. Supp. 468, 475-76 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
' See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1981) (rule 14d-100). A schedule 14D-1 contains essentially
the same information as a schedule 13D. See note 29 supra. The schedule 14D-1, however,
requires more complete information about the offeror's source of funds and the bidder's
plans for the target company under its control. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1981) (rule
14d-100). In addition, the schedule 14D-1 provides for disclosure of any previous negotiations
between the offeror and the target and any financial information about the offeror that may
be material to the tender offer. See id.
s See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976 & Supp. H 1978).
See text accompanying note 7 supra.
See Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Cat-
tlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (W.D. Okla. 1972), vacated per stipula-
tion, Civil No. 72-152 (W.D. Okla. May 8, 1972). For many years the SEC remained reluctant
to define the term "tender offer" to avoid restricting the flexibility necessary to respond to
new forms of corporate acquisition. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-12676
(Aug. 2, 1976), reprinted in [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 80,659, at
86,895-96; What is a Tender Offer?, supra note 4, at 908 n.5. The SEC since has proposed a
definition of the term tender offer. See 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349, 70,349-52 (1979) (proposed rule
1982l 1101
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tions of shares by hostile bidders have sought to impose section 14(d) re-
quirements on bidders by characterizing the acquisitions as "creeping"
tender offers." According to the creeping tender offer analysis, the pur-
pose of the Williams Act is to regulate the problems associated with
tender offers, regardless of whether a takeover actually takes the form
of a conventional tender offer. 8 Thus, Williams Act requirements should
apply whenever the problems arise in a takeover in a form other than a
conventional tender offer.39 One justification for extending section 14(d)
protections is that open market and privately negotiated acquisitions
deprive shareholders of the premium they would otherwise receive if
they were aware of the impending takeover.0 Proponents of the creep-
ing tender offer analysis justify subjecting preacquisition purchases to
tender offer requirements with the remedial nature of the Williams Act
and language in some court opinions calling for liberal construction of
the Act.
4 1
Although several federal district courts have held that open market
14d-l(b)(1)). According to the proposed rule, an offer to purchase securities must satisfy
either of two tests to constitute a tender offer. See id. To qualify under the first test, the
offer must propose to purchase more than 5% of the shares of one class of securities from
more than 10 persons within a 45 day period. See id. Under the second test, the offer must
be made in a widespread manner, exceed the market price of the stock by either 5% or $2
per share, and not be subject to negotiation. See id. at 70,351. Appearing to abandon the
proposed rule, the SEC later recommended to Congress legislative changes designed to
clarify the tender offer definition. See Letter from SEC Chairman Harold Williams to
Senator Harrison Williams (February 15, 1980; SEC Seeks Takeover Rule Change to End
Controversy, Could Increase Firms' Costs, Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1980, at 2, col. 2. More
recently, however, the SEC seems to have dropped its pursuit of either a rule change or a
legislative revision, preferring instead to return to its previous position that defining
"tender offer" would limit the SEC's ability to respond to new acquisition techniques. See
SEC Reconsiders Rules on Tender Offers, Wall St. J., July 17, 1980, at 4, col. 1.
See Atkins, Defense Against Creeping Acquisitions, in PLI, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 129, 140 (A. Fleischer, M. Lipton & R. Mundheim eds.
1981) (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 373) [hereinafter cited as
Atkins]. Proponents of the creeping tender offer theory have argued that certain open
market and privately negotiated purchases should be integrated with any subsequent
tender offer to determine whether to require disclosure before or after the tender offer. See
ARANOw, EINHORN & BERLSTEIN, supra note 21, at 17. Litigants also have advanced creeping
tender offer claims, however, where no formal tender offer has followed the purchases,
arguing that the takeover problems were sufficiently similar to tender offer problems to de-
mand tender offer regulation. See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 820-21 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (W.D. Okla. 1972), vacated per
stipulation, Civil No. 72-152 (W.D. Okla. May 8, 1972); note 42 infra.
See note 37 supra.
See id.
40 See ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 4, at 17.
See Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,455, at 95,590 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (tender offer definition should extend beyond con-
ventional meaning); Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (W.D. Okla. 1972),
vacated per stipulation, Civil No. 72-152 (W.D. Okla. May 8, 1972) (Williams Act is remedial
and should be construed liberally).
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and privately negotiated purchases accompanied by aggressive publicity
or widespread solicitation of target shareholders qualify as a tender
offer," most federal courts have rejected extension of the section 14(d)
disclosure requirements.43 In Ludlow Corp. v. Tyco Laboratories, Inc.,"
the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts ad-
dressed the issue whether open market and privately negotiated pur-
chases constitute a tender offer when accompanied by electronically
transmitted solicitations."5 The plaintiff, Ludlow Corporation (Ludlow),
sought relief from alleged tender offer violations involved in the acquisi-
tion of 28 percent of Ludlow's outstanding shares by Tyco Laboratories,
Inc. (Tyco).46 Ludlow claimed that Tyco's acquisitions constituted an il-
42 See, e.g., Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); S-G
Securities, Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1126-27 (D. Mass. 1978); Cattlemen's
Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1252 (W.D. Okla. 1972), vacated per stipulation, Civil
No. 72-152 (W.D. Okla. May 8, 1972). In Wellman, a bidder solicited offerees by telephone in
its purchase of 34/0 of the shares of Becton, Dickinson & Company from individual and in-
stitutional investors. See 475 F. Supp. at 809-10. The Wellman court held that the limited
time the bidder allowed for response, the inflexibility of the price, and other aspects of the
solicitation were sufficiently similar to a tender offer to be subject to tender offer regula-
tion. See id. at 820-21. In finding shareholder pressures equivalent to a tender offer, the
court in S-G Industries relied on the bidder's prior rejected proposal to acquire the target, a
recently announced intent to obtain control of the target, a recently announced intent to ob-
tain control of the target, and subsequent open market and privately negotiated purchases
of a large block of target shares. See 466 F. Supp. at 1126-27. The court in Cattlemen's found
that the bidder engaged in a widespread solicitation of shareholders through telephone
calls, direct mail, and personal visits. See 343 F. Supp. at 1251-52. The court held that the
solicitations pressured shareholders into making hurried investment decisions without ac-
cess to adequate information. See id. at 1252.
"s See, e.g., Stromfeld v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 484 F. Supp. 1264, 1272-73
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (privately negotiated purchases); Chroma~loy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp.,
474 F. Supp. 1341, 1346-47 (E.D. Mo.), affd on other grounds 611 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1979)
(open market transaction); Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 790
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (open market); Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579, 597-98 (W.D.
Pa. 1975) (privately negotiated); Gulf & W. Indus. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 356 F. Supp.
1066, 1074 (S.D.N.Y.), affd on other grounds, 476 F. 2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973) (open market); see
Einhorn, What is a "Tender Offer?" in PLI, TENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION 245, 249 (A. Fleischer, M. Lipton & R. Stevenson eds. 1979).
" [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98, 383, at 92,303 (D. Mass.
1981). At the state level, the Massachusetts Securities Division in In re Ludlow Corp. was
more receptive than the federal court to the claim that a suitor's purchases before a
takeover bid constitute a tender offer. See In re Ludlow Corp., [1978-1981 Transfer Binder]
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,646, at 69,288 (Mass. Securities Div. 1981).
" See [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,383, at 92,306.
"8 See id. at 92,304. In the action against Tyco Laboratories, Ludlow Corporation
sought injunctive and declaratory relief, damages, and an order requiring defendants to
divest themselves of the Ludlow stock acquired. See id. at 92,304. Ludlow had succeeded
earlier in obtaining a temporary restraining order against Tyco based on alleged inac-
curacies in Tyco's schedule 13D disclosures. See Ludlow Corp. v. Tyco Laboratories, Inc.
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,382, at 98,301 (D. Mass. 1981). Tyco
purchased Ludlow shares in its own name and in the name of AMBG, a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of Tyco. See [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,383, at 92,304.
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legal creeping tender offer in violation of section 14 of the Williams
Act." Ludlow charged that Tyco's purchases were sufficiently public to
be characterized as a tender offer because the solicitations occurred
through the use of Autex, an electronic communications system pro-
viding market information to subscribers."
In assessing whether Tyco's acquisitions shared enough common
characteristics with tender offers to merit tender offer status, the court
reviewed several tests which have evolved to define tender offers."
Without applying the tests specifically, the court rejected per se that
open market purchases, however aggressive, constitute a tender offer."
The court relied on the distinction in the Williams Act between tender
offers under section 14(d) and open market and privately negotiated ac-
quisitions under section 13(d).5' Under the specific facts in Ludlow, the
court failed to find the public or widespread solicitation of shareholders
that ordinarily typifies a tender offer.12 Ludlow never linked the Autex
" See [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,383, at 92,305; 15
U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976 & Supp. II 1978) ('34 Act, § 14(d)).
" See [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,383, at 92,305. In
Ludlow, Tyco's broker, Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc. issued a one-day interest message to in-
stitutional investors requesting indications of interest in Ludlow shares. See id. Although
broadcast only on one day, subscribers could recall the announcement at any time within
the following three months. See id. The message did not specify that Tyco was the party in-
terested in purchasing Ludlow's shares. See id.
," See id. at 92,307-09. Although the Ludlow court refused to endorse any specific
criteria, the court reviewed the leading tests for defining tender offers. See id. at 92,307.
Initially, the court considered a test suggested in the Harvard Law Review which concen-
trates on the harms inherent in improper attempts to pressure shareholders to tender their
shares. See id.; Developing Meaning, supra note 4, at 1251-52. The focus of the test is
whether the impact of a purchaser's activities is to force shareholders into entering transac-
tions without sufficient information or time to consider the decision. See [1981-1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,383, at 92,307. The Ludlow court listed as an
alternative test the factors advanced by the SEC for defining whether stock accumulations
result in a tender offer. See id. at 92,307-08. The SEC has advocated examining how
widespread the solicitation is, the percentage of target shares acquired, the premium over
the market price, the terms of the offer, the minimum shares necessary to consummate the
transfer, and the publicity surrounding the offer. See id.; Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc.,
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,382, at 92,308; 466 F. Supp. 1114,
1126-27 (D. Mass. 1978). The court in S-G Industries held that a publicly announced intent to
purchase a significant block of target shares to gain control coupled with a subsequent rapid
accumulation of target shares through open market and privately negotiated transactions
constituted a tender offer. See 466 F. Supp. at 1126-27; note 42 supra.
See [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,383, at 92,308. See also
Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities, Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Kennecott Cop-
per Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 449 F. Supp. 951, 961 (S.D.N.Y.), affd in par rev'd in
part, 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978).
", See [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,383, at 92,308. Com-
pare 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976 & Supp. 1978) ('34 Act, § 13(d)) with id. § 78n(d) ('34 Act, §
14(d)). See note 68 infra.
' See [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,383, at 92,308; text ac-
companying note 42 supra.
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message to any request by Tyco or its agents to transmit the com-
munication." Moreover, the court noted that shareholders who did enter
into negotiations with Tyco initiated the transactions. 4
The court examined Tyco's transactions to determine if certain
pressure tactics existed which are common in tender offers.55 Tyco did
not require a minimum number of shares to consummate its purchases
and offered no premium price, but bought all available shares on the
market at current prices.' The privately negotiated transactions involved
large blocks of shares owned by institutional investors with sufficient
financial knowledge and investment data to make informed decisions. 7
The court emphasized that institutional investors and other
sophisticated offerees do not require the same safeguards as uninformed
shareholders whom Congress intended the Williams Act to protect.5
Hence, the Ludlow court joined most other federal courts in denying at-
tempts to characterize open market and privately negotiated purchases
as tender offers.
In contrast to the Ludlow court's review of the various tests for
defining tender offers, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan reached the same result in Luptak v. Central Car-
tage Co." by emphasizing the legislative history of the Williams Act and
the practical effect of including open market and privately negotiated
purchases within the tender offer definition. 1 The plaintiff, Luptak, filed
the action on behalf of himself and other shareholders"2 of the Detroit In-
ternational Bridge Company (DIBC), which was the subject of an acquisi-
tion attempt by Central Cartage Co. (Cartage)." Cartage made its pur-
See [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,383, at 92,305. Because
Ludlow never established that Tyco authorized the electronic solicitation message, the
court rejected on a factual basis Ludlow's assertion that Tyco's activities were public. See
id.
See id.
See id. at 92,308-09.
"See id.
s' See id. at 92,309. In Ludlow, Tyco privately negotiated purchases of Ludlow shares
from such large institutional investors as Morgan Guaranty Trust. See id. at 92,309. The in-
stitutional investors were not only sophisticated investors but also had access to financial
information generally unavailable to ordinary traders. See id.
" See id. See also Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 449 F. Supp. 951,
961 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Williams Act primarily intended to protect uninformed investors, not
sophisticated offerees).
" See note 43 supra.
See [Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,034, at 91,349 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
See id. at 91,353.
E'2 In Luptak, the court rejected plaintiffs standing to bring the action derivatively or
through a class action on behalf of the other shareholders. See id. at 91,347. The court,
however, allowed plaintiff to continue the lawsuit in his individual capacity as a
shareholder. See id.
" See id. at 91,350-01. In addition to stock accumulations by Central Cartage Co. (Cart-
age), several other potential tender offerors, including the plaintiff, vied for shares in the
Detroit International Bridge Co. (DIBC). See id.
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chases in the over the counter market64 while another bidder was engaged
in a tender offer for DIBC 5 Luptak relied on the novel argument that
the court should treat Cartage's acquisitions as a tender offer because
Cartage purchased DIBC's shares under the "umbrella" of the other bid-
der's tender offer.6 The court, stressing the open market source of Car-
tage's shares, disregarded plaintiffs argument that Cartage's independ-
ent acquisitions amounted to an illegal tender offer. 7
The court in Luptak noted that both the Williams Act and its
legislative history distinguish between tender offers and aggressive
market acquisitions."5 The court also recognized the impracticalities of
extending the substantive tender offer provisions of the Williams Act to
pre-tender offer purchases. 9 The court found that characterizing pre-
tender offer acquisitions as a conventional tender offer would subject
open market and privately negotiated purchases to the withdrawal, pro-
ration, and equality of treatment provisions of section 14(d).70 Section
14(d) requires offerors to allow shareholders to withdraw tendered
shares within a certain period, to purchase on a pro rata basis the shares
exceeding the requested number, and to extend any subsequent price in-
crease to all tendering shareholders.71 To avoid rendering the substan-
See id. at 91,350.
65 See id. In Luptak, Cartage began its buying program in the midst of a tender offer
by Wesco Financial Corp. See id. Cartage's purchases, however, extended beyond Wesco's
expiration date for accepting tendered DIBC shares. See id.
See id. at 91, 353.
See id.
See id. See also Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 790 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (reviewing legislative history of Williams Act). Comments by Senator Harrison
Williams, author and principal proponent of the Williams Act, and by SEC Chairman
Manuel Cohen specifically refer to the distinction between tender offers and other forms of
large scale purchases. See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 16-17, 24-25, 36 (1967).
69 See [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,034, at 91,353.
o See id.
71 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5)-(7) (1976 & Supp. II 1978) ('34 Act, § 14(d)(5)-(7)). To relieve
the pressures on shareholders faced with a tender offer, Congress imposed substantive re-
quirements on offerors engaging in a tender offer. See House Rep., supra note 24, at 2820.
Once an offeror commences a tender offer, the tender offer must remain open for a
minimum of 20 business days. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1981) (rule 14e-1). A tendering
shareholder has the right to withdraw tendered shares within 15 business days and after 60
days from the announcement of the tender offer. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1981) (rule
14d-7). The offeror must purchase pro rata all of the shares tendered during the first ten
days of the offer if the total shares tendered exceeds the number of shares sought. See 15
U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1976) ('34 Act, § 14(d)(6)). A bidder increasing the price offered for the
shares before expiration of the tender offer must pay the increased price to every
shareholder participating in the tender offer. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1981) ('34 Act, §
14(d)(7)). Given the volume and frequency of open market and privately negotiated transac-
tions, the § 14(d) substantive provisions are incompatible with pre-tender offer acquisitions.
See Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Kennecott
Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1207 (2d Cir. 1978); Law, Lipton &
Flom, supra note 10, at 201.
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tive provisions of section 14 unworkable in the context of pre-tender
offer acquisitions, the court rejected plaintiffs attempt to construe Car-
tage's purchases as a tender offer."
The trend in the federal courts to reject creeping tender offer
theories reflects the realization that pre-tender offer accumulations do
not contain the same problems inherent in formal tender offers." A
target shareholder confronted with a cash tender offer must decide
whether to sell his shares or retain his interest in the target company
under new management. 4 Thus, information about the background and
future plans of the bidder available through the schedule 14D-1 is
valuable to the offeree in evaluating his decision whether to tender his
shares. 5 By contrast, the only evaluation required of a shareholder in an
open market or privately negotiated transaction is his decision to sell,
and information as to the value of the shares owned is already available
in the market. ' Although a shareholder may later regret selling his
shares when he learns of a subsequent tender offer, the initiative to sell
the stock is nevertheless the shareholder's own and involves no more
pressure than other ordinary market transactions."
The second recent development likely to plague multistep acquisi-
tions is the greater scrutiny courts have applied to provisions included
in takeover agreements designed to "lock up" the transaction. 8 The
lockup is a relatively new technique by which parties to a friendly
takeover seek to improve the chances that the acquisition will succeed. 9
See [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,034, at 91,353.
See note 43 supra.
' See Fischel, supra note 1, at 10-11.
,' See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 18 (statement of SEC Chairman Manuel
F. Cohen).
,' See id. at 17.
" See Cohen, Open Market and Privately Negotiated Purchases of Stock, in PLI,
ELEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 87, 87-88 (A. Fleischer, M. Lipton
& R. Stevenson eds. 1980).
," See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 49, 53 (6th Cir.),
rev'g [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,375, at 92,262 (S.D. Ohio
1981); Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
text accompanying notes 88-131 infra. One commentator has suggested that the term "lock-
up" may be a misnomer, because the agreements more accurately serve to provide only a
"leg-up" or an advantage for a favorable bidder. See Nathan, supra note 25, at 16. The par-
ties to lockup agreements may prefer the term lockup because the implication that the deal
is certain to occur may deter rival bidders. See id.
7 See Bialkin, Court Costs Cloud Over Option Tactic in Take-overs, Legal Times of
Wash., Jan. 11, 1982, at 19 [hereinafter cited as Bialkin]. The lockup technique offers several
distinct advantages as a means of acquiring shares in a target company. By engaging in
private negotiations rather than public bidding, a bidder employing the lockup technique
may avoid engendering management hostility to an open takeover attempt. See
Developments on Offense, supra note 23, at 28. By keeping the negotiations private, the two
parties may avoid disclosure requirements until they have entered into a binding agree-
ment. See id. at 30. The bidder, thus, may escape public embarassment should the target
rebuff the bidder's overtures. See Freund, supra note 6, at 511. Once the parties agree upon
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The lockup generally takes the form of a stock purchase or option agree-
ment between the bidder and the target's management or its principal
shareholders."0 The lockup also may consist of an agreement by the
target to sell or grant an option to sell to the bidder a key asset of the
target company. 1 Another variation is a negative lockup which consists
of an agreement by the target management or shareholders not to
tender or sell their shares to a rival bidder.2
Under federal law the provision most likely to affect lockup
agreements is section 14(e) of the '34 Act." Section 14(e) prohibits
the lockup provisions, however, the parties often choose to disclose the existence of the
agreement to discourage unfriendly bidders. See Nathan, supra note 25, at 19. Because a
bidder can lock up the price at a fixed level, the suitor may avoid a bidding war that could
otherwise escalate the price of the target stock. See Developments on Offense, supra note
23, at 28. Hence, a bidder may deter potential competitors by acquiring a substantial block
of a target's shares before initiating a formal tender offer. See id. at 27. Conversely, a
target company may attract friendly bidders to rescue the company from an unwanted offer
by promising generous stock or asset options to would-be "white knights," friendly suitors
to whom a target turns when confronted with a hostile tender offer. See Bialkin, supra, at
19.
'o See Nathan, supra note 25, at 60. The lockup technique developed as a stock pur-
chase agreement by principal target shareholders to support a bidder's proposed takeover
by transferring their shares to the bidder. See id. at 59. The option agreement provided bid-
ders an alternative to committing themselves to the purchase of the shares until the bidders
assured their success. See id. at 44. Increasingly, bidders have approached target manage-
ment directly with proposed lockups as part of an acquisition package. See id. at 59-60. A
lockup agreement with target management can occur only if management favors the
takeover, unlike lockups with target shareholders which are available even if the target
management opposes the acquisition. See id. at 60. One way target management can sup-
port a takeover is by making available to the bidder authorized yet unissued shares under a
stock purchase or option agreement. See id. See also ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 4, at
247; Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,375, at 92,268 (6th Cir. 1981); text accompanying notes 88-131 infra. Issuance of additional
target shares to a friendly bidder increases the total shares which rival bidders must ac-
quire to achieve a takeover. See ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 4, at 247.
8 See Nathan, supra note 25, at 75. In addition to entering a stock purchase or option
agreement with the bidder, target management may agree to sell to the bidder or grant an
option on a principal asset of the target company. See id.; Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.,
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,375, at 92,268 (6th Cir. 1981); text
accompanying notes 88-131 infra. By committing to sell a key asset to a friendly bidder, the
target may dissuade unfriendly suitors that might lose interest in the target if the asset is
likely to be sold before they have the chance to acquire the target company. See Nathan,
supra note 25, at 75. Because most target companies consist of several key operations, few
targets can boast of any single asset sufficiently important to dissuade hostile bidders fear-
ing its sale. See id. at 77. Moreover, to provide an effective deterrent, the target must con-
vince unfriendly bidders that the target would complete the sale even if the unwanted
suitor succeeded in outbidding the favored acquiror. See id.
See Nathan, supra note 25, at 75.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976 & Supp. II 1978). In addition to the § 14(e) antifraud pro-
visions of the '34 Act, lockup agreements in the form of stock purchase or option
agreements involving substantial holdings of target shares may be subject to § 13(d)
disclosure provisions. See text accompanying notes 26-30 supra. A friendly bidder agreeing
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fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative activity associated with a tender
offer.84 Litigation under section 14(e) ordinarily arises in two contexts. 5
Litigants may use section 14(e) as a basis for alleging that a party failed
to file promptly with the SEC or adequately disclose the details of a
lockup agreement.88 A more serious threat is the contention that lockup
agreements constitute a manipulative device under section 14(e).87
Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.88 was the first federal appellate case
to consider whether lockup agreements are manipulative under section
to a stock purchase or option agreement with a target company for over 5% of the target
shares must file within 10 days of its execution a schedule 13D if the right to acquire owner-
ship is exercisable within 60 days. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (1981)
(rule 13d-3); note 29 supra. A company which becomes the target of a tender offer must file
and disseminate within 10 days a schedule 14D-9, disclosing any lockup arrangements. 17
C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1981) (rule 14e-2). See Nathan, supra note 25, at 74. A schedule 14D-9 re-
quires disclosure of any stock purchase or option agreements that may affect the tender
offer. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 (1981) (rule 14d-1); Nathan, supra note 25, at 74. In
negotiating lockup agreements, the parties also should be aware that their agreement may
run afoul of the § 14(d) tender offer provisions. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976); Nathan, supra
note 25, at 25-26. Lockup agreements may be subject to contest as an unconventional tender
offer requiring disclosure before consummation. See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp.
783, 820-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding widespread solicitation of state purchase agreements to
be tender offer); note 42 supra. See also Nathan, supra note 25, at 26.
At the state level, stock purchase and option agreements would be exempt from regula-
tion in many states which do not regulate acquisitions which target management approves.
See text accompanying note 22 supra. In addition to specific statutes, lockup agreements
are subject to common law principles of fiduciary duty. See note 195 infra. The question
may arise whether a controlling shareholder entering into a lockup agreement for transfer
of his shares owes a fiduciary duty to insure that his fellow shareholders share any premium
he receives. See Nathan, supra note 25, at 38. Most courts now reject that a principal
shareholder is obligated to guarantee that fellow shareholders receive the same price for
their shares. See, e.g., Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Cane Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 376 (2d Cir.
1980); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Yerke v. Batman, 63 Ind.
App. 99, -, 376 N.E.2d 1211, 1215 (Ct. App. 1978). See Nathan, supra note 25, at 78;
Freund & Volk, supra note 6, at 9. Moreover, because most lockup agreements provide for
the bidder to extend the same price offer to all shareholders, few lockups would face a con-
trol premium contest. See Nathan, supra note 25, at 38.
", See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976 & Supp. H 1978). Congress added the § 14(e) antifraud
provision to the '34 Act to insure that parties engaged in a tender offer fully and accurately
disclose any material information relating to the tender offer. See 1968 House Rep., supra
note 24, at 2821. In drafting § 14(e), Congress employed language similar to that found in §
10(b) of the '34 Act and rule 10b-5. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) ('34 Act, § 10(b)) and 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981) (rule lOb-5) with 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976) ('34 Act, § 14(e)). See
generally Note, The Scope of the Disclosure Duty Under SEC Rule 14e-S, 38 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1055, 1062-64 (1981).
See Nathan, supra note 25, at 36.
H See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) § 98,375, at 92,270 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Applied Digital Data Systems, Inc. v. Milgo Elec.
Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145, 1150-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); text accompanying notes 88-131 infra.
' See note 86 supra.
U See [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,375, at 92,262 (S.D.
Ohio), rev'd, 14 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 49 (6th Cir. 1981).
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14(e).89 In Mobil, Mobil Corporation (Mobil) brought an action to
preliminarily enjoin United States Steel Corporation's (U.S. Steel) at-
tempt to take over the Marathon Oil Company (Marathon)."' The dispute
arose after a Mobil tender offer for Marathon9 1 prompted Marathon's
management to search for a more favorable bidder. 2 When U.S. Steel
emerged as a suitable white knight,93 Marathon and U.S. Steel entered
into negotiations resulting in a proposal by U.S. Steel to acquire
Marathon. The agreement proposed a cash tender offer95 and a merger
upon successful completion of the tender offer. The agreement included
a lockup provision granting an option for U.S. Steel to purchase author-
ized but unissued Marathon stock97 and an option to buy Marathon's
mineral interests in the Yates oil field in case a third party preempted
U.S. Steel from completing the takeover. Before announcing the tender
offer, U.S. Steel filed the required schedule 14D-1 with the SEC. In an
attempt to block the transaction, Mobil challenged whether U.S. Steel
and Marathon complied with the disclosure requirements of the Williams
Act. ' Mobil also charged Marathon and U.S. Steel with manipulative
practices in violation of section 14(e).
101
" See 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at 53-54.
See [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,375, at 92,263. The
U.S. District Court hearing in Mobil involved an application by Mobil Corporation (Mobil)
for a preliminary injunction against the Marathon Oil Company (Marathon), not a trial on
the merits of the case. See id.
91 See id. at 92,264-65. Mobil began its takeover attempt of Marathon by offering to
purchase up to 40 million shares of Marathon common for $85 per share, provided that at
least 30 million were tendered. See id.
See id. at 92,265-66.
" See id. at 92,267. One reason Marathon considered the United States Steel Corpora-
tion (U.S. Steel) a more favorable bidder than Mobil was that U.S. Steel proposed to main-
tain Marathon's corporate headquarters in Findlay, Ohio, rather than move the head-
quarters to New York City as Mobil proposed. See id. at 92,265-66. Additionally, U.S. Steel's
takeover was less likely to pose serious antitrust problems. See id. at 92,263 n.1.
" See id. at 92,267-68. U.S. Steel entered into agreements with Marathon both in its
own name and in the name of its wholly owned subsidiary, USS, Inc. See id. at 92,263 n.1.
, See id. at 92,268. U.S. Steel offered to purchase up to 30 million shares, or 51%/o, of
Marathon's stock at $125 per share. See id.
" See id. The merger agreement between Marathon and U.S. Steel provided that
Marathon would merge with USS, Inc., a subsidiary of U.S. Steel, upon successful consum-
mation of the tender offer. See id.
' See id. The stock option between Marathon and U.S. Steel gave U.S. Steel the op-
tion to purchase up to 10 million shares of authorized but unissued Marathon common stock
for $90 per share in either cash or securities. See id.
' See id. The Yates oil field, located in western Texas, is one of the nation's most pro-
ductive oil and gas fields and constitutes a substantial part of the Marathon stock's value.
See id. at 92,273-74.
" See id.; note 33 supra.
' See [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,375, at 92,268.
.. See id. at 92,263. In its complaint, Mobil contended that the schedule 14D-1 filing
and communications with Marathon shareholders lacked material facts necessary for
understanding U.S. Steel's tender offer and merger proposals. See id.; 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)
(1976 & Supp. II 1978) ('34 Act, § 14(e)).
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In addressing both the disclosure and manipulation claims, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio focused on
the parties' adherence to the Williams Act disclosure requirements."2
The court held that the defendants not only fully complied with the man-
dated Williams Act disclosures,"3 but that the adequacy of the
disclosures also fulfilled the defendants' antifraud obligations under sec-
tion 14(e).' 4 The court characterized Mobil's charge that the defendants
violated section 14(e) as simply a claim that the Marathon directors acted
unfairly and in conflict with the fiduciary duty owed to Marathon and its
shareholders."5 The district court relied on the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green"' to conclude that
complete disclosure fulfills the antifraud requirements of the Williams
Act."7 Because the trial court doubted Mobil's probability of success on
the merits of its claims, the court denied Mobil's request for a
preliminary injunction. '
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit singled out the section 14(e) manipula-
tion issue as the sole basis for reversing the district court's denial of
Mobil's request for a preliminary injunction.' 9 The Sixth Circuit held
that the lockup agreement granting U.S. Steel the irrevocable option to
purchase the Marathon shares and the contingent option to obtain
See [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,375, at 92,278-82.
103 See id. at 92,278-80.
,' See id. at 92,281-82.
,o See id. at 92,281. By construing Mobil's manipulation argument merely to be a
breach of fiduciary duty claim, the district court in Mobil held that Mobil failed to state a
recognizable claim under the federal securities laws. See id.; In re Sunshine Mining Co. Sec.
Litigation, 496 F. Supp. 9, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (breach of fiduciary duty not cause of action
under § 14(e)).
430 U.S. 462 (1977). Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green involved an allegation that a
majority stockholder breached his fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders by engaging
without any legitimate business purpose in a short-form merger that eliminated the minority
interests. See id. at 467-68. The Court determined that a breach of fiduciary duty, absent
any deception or nondisclosure, does not constitute a "manipulative" practice under § 10(b)
of the '34 Act, a provision with language similar to § 14(e). Id. at 476. Compare 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b) (1976) ('34 Act, § 10(b)) with 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976 & Supp. II 1978) ('34 Act, § 14(e)).
To establish a federal securities violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant
artificially affected market activity to deceive investors. See 430 U.S. at 476-77. Otherwise,
the plaintiff's only recourse is to pursue his breach of fiduciary duty claim under state law.
See id. See generally Jacobs, How Sante Fe Affects lOb-5's Proscriptions Against Cor-
porate Mismanagement, 6 SEC. REG. L.J. 3 (1978); Sherard, Federal Judicial and Regulatory
Response to Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 695 (1978); Note,
Suits for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under Rule 10b-5 After Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1874 (1978).
See [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,375, at 92,281-82.
See id. at 92,281.
"' See 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 49, 50 (6th Cir. 1981). Because the Sixth Circuit in
Mobil relied exclusively on the manipulation claim in reversing the district court, the ap-
pellate panel avoided considering whether Marathon violated the Williams Act disclosure
requirements or Ohio law. See id. at 50 n.2; 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976 & Supp. II 1978) ('34 Act,
§ 14(e)); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.96 (Baldwin 1978).
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Marathon's interests in the Yates oil field constituted a manipulative act
in violation of section 14(e)." Because the '34 Act does not define the
term "manipulative" in the context of tender offers,"' the Sixth Circuit
looked to the Supreme Court decision in Sante Fe" to determine
whether defendants' activities were among those proscribed by the
Williams Act."' In Sante Fe the Supreme Court described
"manipulative" as a term of art in the financial community, referring to
practices intended to deceive investors by "artificially affecting" the
market price of stock."4 The Supreme Court listed wash sales,"5 matched
orders,"6 and rigged prices"7 as examples of manipulative practices."8
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the lockup agreement between U.S.
Steel and Marathon was as manipulative as any conceivable device in ar-
tificially affecting the market for Marathon's shares."9 The Sixth Circuit
held that the lockup device not only manipulated the price but also
obstructed the usual market activity of the stock."'
In ruling that the lockup agreement between U.S. Steel and
Marathon was manipulative, the Sixth Circuit concluded that granting
U.S. Steel the contingent option of severing the Yates oil field from
Marathon's holdings in the event U.S. Steel lost its bid had the effect of
discouraging rival bidders.'2' Because acquisition of Marathon shorn of
the Yates oil field could make Marathon a much less attractive target,
the court deemed the lockup an artificial ceiling on the value of
Marathon's shares.22 Moreover, U.S. Steel's irrevocable option to pur-
"' See 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at 55.
.., See id. at 53.
112 430 U.S. 462 (1977). See note 106 supra.
1 See 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at 55.
114 See 430 U.S. at 476.
"' A "wash sale" is a fictitious transaction involving no change in the beneficial owner-
ship of stock, in which the seller does not expect to make nor the buyer to receive delivery
of the securities. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 205 n.27 (1979).
118 "Matched orders" are orders for the transfer of a security that are entered by a party
trading with himself or with someone acting in concert with him, knowing that substantially
similar orders will be entered by the same or different persons at substantially the same
time or price. See id.
117 "Price rigging" denotes the practice of escalating the price of stock or enhancing its
quoted value through a series of pretended purchases, intending to create the impression of
an unusual demand for the stock. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1189 (5th ed. 1979).
118 See 430 U.S. at 476.
118 See 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at 53.
12 See id.
121 See id. at 54. Because the lockup agreement in Mobil provided that U.S. Steel could
exercise its option on the Yates oil field in the event U.S. Steel lost its takeover bid, the
lockup agreement effectively precluded rival bidders from obtaining Marathon intact. See
id.
122 See id. The Sixth Circuit in Mobil reasoned that absent competition over the price
of the stock, Marathon shareholders would lose the advantage of a bidding war between
rival suitors for the stock. See id.
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chase a significant block of Marathon shares similarly could deter poten-
tial bidders.123 Hence, the court reasoned that the effect of the manage-
ment negotiations between U.S. Steel and Marathon was to circumvent
the normal market for Marathon shares.1 24 The court concluded that by
entering into an agreement governing the disposition of Marathon's
shares and assets, Marathon's directors deprived the company's
shareholders of the choice whether or not to tender their shares to a
third party.'1
The Sixth Circuit rejected the defendants' argument and the district
court's conclusion that assuring proper disclosure fulfills the obligations
of the Williams Act prohibitions against manipulative tactics.26 The
Sixth Circuit disputed the trial court's reading of Sante Fe"2 to mean
that once a court determines that proper disclosure has been made the
court need not inquire into the fairness of the transaction."2 The Sixth
Circuit cautioned against construing Sante Fe to hold that manipulative
practices are legal so long as fully disclosed.' 9 Given the court's opinion
that the lockup agreement foreclosed the possibility of other tender
offers, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the lockup provision denied
shareholders any choice but to accept the directors' accord whether or
not the agreement was disclosed.1 3 In reversing the district court, the
Sixth Circuit ordered that the U.S. Steel tender offer, without the two
12 See id. Because U.S. Steel obtained an option on a substantial block of authorized
but unissued Marathon Shares which U.S. Steel could exercise at any time in a bidding con-
test, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the option could deter competing bidders. See id. at
114.
,U See id. While not objecting to the district court's finding that the $2.8 billion
Marathon would receive for the Yates oil field was a fair price, the Sixth Circuit in Mobil
noted that evidence was available that the Yates oil field might be worth as much as $3.6
billion. See id. Regardless of the actual market value, the Sixth Circuit deemed the open
market the only means to determine the value of the Yates oil field. See id.
" See id. at 54-55. The Sixth Circuit in Mobil considered mere compliance with the
disclosure requirements of the Williams Act an inadequate safeguard for Marathon
shareholders. See id. at 55. Under the court's analysis, full disclosure of the accomplished
fact of the lockup agreement would offer little protection for Marathon shareholders who
would have no choice but to accept the completed deal. See id. The court's interpretation of
§ 14(e) favored a broader construction of the provision to preclude target management
agreements which have the effect of foreclosing shareholder participation in bidding con-
tests for stock. See id.
See id. at 55.
'= 430 U.S. 462 (1977); see note 106 supra.
12 See [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,375, at 92,281-82; note
105 supra.
' See 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at 55.
'° See id. The Sixth Circuit refused to hold either the Marathon directors or U.S.
Steel's management responsible for the alleged manipulation. Id. Rather, the court pointed
to language in § 14(e) prohibiting manipulation by "any person" in connection with a tender
offer to hold that the agreement was illegal regardless of which party was at fault. See id.;
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976 & Supp. H 1978).
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option provisions, remain open for a reasonable time and that Marathon
allow its shareholders to withdraw any tendered shares.3 '
Although the Sixth Circuit purported to limit its decision to the
lockup device employed in Mobil,'32 the court's holding could have far
reaching effect if extended to lockup agreements generally. Lockup
agreements resulting from a genuine bargain between a bidder and a
target are not inherently manipulative and should not trigger
automatically the antifraud provisions of the Williams Act.'33 The Sixth
Circuit's opinion, however, suggests that in bidding contests a bidder
may not use a promise of an increased price for target stock to pressure
a target into yielding concessions that might make the target stock
undesirable to rival bidders."4 Denying corporate management the op-
portunity to negotiate the granting of a stock or asset package may have
the effect of limiting rather than expanding shareholder choice. 3' By
offering assurances as to the disposition of corporate shares or assets, a
target may attract more generous bids for target stock."'
As the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York noted recently, bargaining to obtain a higher offer coincides with
the shareholders' best interest by advancing rather than obstructing the
market for the company's stock.' 7 The effect of confining bidders to un-
conditional bids, as the Sixth Circuit in Mobil did, may be more likely to
discourage than to generate higher bids.'3 ' Provided negotiations are at
arm's length and the price is the product of a genuine bargain, manage-
ment bartering to obtain a higher price for a company's shares differs lit-
tle from other commercial transactions."' If directors uphold their
,31 See 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at 55. One member of the Sixth Circuit in Mobil
dissented on the grounds that Marathon's success in its antitrust case enjoining Mobil's
tender offer rendered the lawsuit under the Williams Act moot. See id. at 55-56 (Merritt, J.,
dissenting).
1 See id. at 55.
,33 See id. Labelling lockup agreements as inherently manipulative would ignore the
United States Supreme Court's restriction of the term manipulative to devices which arti-
ficially affect the price of the stock. See Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476
(1977); text accompanying notes 114-18 supra. Lockup agreements achieved through
substantive negotiations between bidders and targets may represent a genuine measure of
the value of the target shares. See Bialkin, supra note 79, at 19.
'3 See id.
's' See id.
' See Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,616, at 93,095, 93,061 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); text accompanying notes 146-49 infra; Gilson, supra
note 10, at 869. Generally, an attempt by target management to engage in a defensive
merger with a white knight is likely to generate a higher bid by the unfriendly bidder. See
Fischel, supra note 1, at 59. Proposing a stock or asset package may stimulate a bidding war
between the rival bidders, with the target shareholders the ultimate beneficiaries. See id.
at 39.
" See Bialkin, supra note 79, at 19.
"3 See id. The nature of target management decisionmaking in response to a takeover
differs little from such other important corporate decisions as voting for a major capital ex-
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fiduciary duty to the shareholders, good faith negotiations by directors
should advance rather than hinder shareholder interests.4 '
In the wake of the Mobil decision, two district courts have
distinguished the lockup options in Mobil from lockup agreements con-
taining binding commitments for transfer of target assets or shares to a
friendly third party in the face of a hostile tender offer."' The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois tacitly approved
of Mobil but resisted extension of the decision to target agreements to
sell a corporate asset outright to a third party.' The court agreed with
Mobil that granting an option to a friendly bidder which is exercisable
only if a hostile bidder gains control of the target may affect the market
price of the stock."3 The court, however, held that a sale of a target asset
penditure or hiring a new chief executive officer. See Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's
Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 109-18 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Lipton]; Perlmutter,
Shareholders vs. the Corporation, N.Y. Times, March 9, 1980, § 3, at 18, col. 3. But see
Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1198 n.106 (1981) (distinguishing between target's
takeover responses and other management decisions).
140 See Bialkin, supra note 79, at 19. State fiduciary law traditionally has been the
source of shareholder protections from abuses by corporate management. See Nathan,
supra note 25, at 66; note 195 infra. The United States Supreme Court in Sante Fe Indus.,
Inc. v. Green stated that disgruntled shareholders should look for remedies for corporate
mismanagement in state fiduciary laws rather than in the federal securities statutes. 430
U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977). See note 195 infra.
'" See Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,482, at 92,821, 92,832 (N.D. Ill. 1982), affd without opinion, - F.2d __ (7th Cir.
1982); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,616,
at 93,059, 93,061 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
"' See [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,482, at 92,832. The lockup
agreement which prompted the litigation in Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar arose out of attempts
by Brunswick Corp. (Brunswick) to fend off a tender offer by Whittaker Corp. (Whittaker).
See id. at 92,822. On January 6, 1982, Whittaker launched a tender offer for up to 10,400,000
shares of Brunswick common stock and up to $30,000,000 of Brunswick debentures. See id.
at 92,822-23. Whittaker increased its tender offer on February 10, 1982. See id. at 92,825. To
undercut the Whittaker tender offer, Brunswick entered into an agreement with American
Home Products Corp. (American Home) for American Home to acquire all of the outstand-
ing shares of Brunswick's subsidiary, Sherwood Medical Industries, Inc. (Sherwood). See id.
at 92,826. American Home agreed to make a tender offer for up to 14,166,666 shares of
Brunswick common stock. See id. American Home then would redeem 13,772,000 shares of-
the Brunswick stock for the Sherwood shares. See id. American Home commenced its
tender offer for Brunswick on February 16, 1982. See id.
On February 23, 1982, Whittaker added a request for a preliminary injunction to block
the lockup agreement to other litigation already in progress between Whittaker and
Brunswick. See id. at 92,828. Relying on Mobil, Whittaker charged that Brunswick violated
§ 14(e) of the '34 Act by entering into an illegal lockup agreement with American Home for
the disposition of the Sherwood subsidiary. See id.; 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976 & Supp. II 1978)
('34 Act, § 14(e)).
" See id. at 92,832. In ruling on Whittaker's motion for a preliminary injunction, the
district court emphasized that under Mobil violation of § 14(e) of the '34 Act through a
manipulative lockup device is an appropriate basis for injunctive relief. See id. at 92,829.
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to a third party does not interfere with the normal market for the
stock.'" Hence, the court denied that an outright sale of a corporate
asset by a target confronted with an unfriendly tender offer violates sec-
tion 14(e) of the '34 Act.
45
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York also rejected application of Mobil to binding sales of target shares
or assets to a third party in the face of a takeover.'48 Because the court
considered Mobil as deviating from controlling Second Circuit law,
however, the court regarded Mobil as questionable authority.47 The
court deemed Mobil as encroaching on the right of target management
to defend target companies against takeover attempts which target
management finds detrimental to target shareholders.' 8 The court
favored granting target management wide discretion, subject to
fiduciary standards, to act on behalf of shareholders to resist takeover
attempts.'49
The practice of negotiating multistep acquisitions also has been sub-
ject to contest when the resulting takeover agreements have included
"standstill" provisions."' In a standstill agreement the bidder agrees to
The court also relied on Mobil to hold that Whittaker as a tender offeror had standing to
bring the action. See id. at 92,832.
." See id. The Whittaker court noted that in Mobil Marathon granted U.S. Steel an op-
tion on the Yates oil field which could be exercised only if a third party defeated U.S. Steel's
takeover bid. See id. In Whittaker, however, Brunswick proposed the outright sale of its
Sherwood subsidiary to American Home. See id. Thus, the court concluded that the agree-
ment would not artificially affect the market price for the Whittaker stock. See id.
See id.; 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976 & Supp. II 1978) ('34 Act, § 14(e)).
[1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,616, at 93,061. Marshall Field &
Co. v. Icahn involved an attempt by Marshall Field & Co. (Marshall Field) to block a group
of investors (Icahn) from taking over the company. See id. at 93,059-60. Following Icahn's ac-
quisition of substantial shares of Marshall Field, the company entered into a series of
agreements with BATUS, Inc. (BATUS) and other potential investors. See id. Under a stock
purchase agreement with BATUS, Marshall Field proposed to sell BATUS two million
shares at the tender offer price of $25.50 per share. See id. at 93,060. BATUS later increased
its tender price to $30 per share. See id. Under another agreement BATUS obtained a right
of first refusal for Marshall Field's Chicago Division should the division be sold within one
year of termination of a BATUS-Marshall Field merger agreement. See id. A third set of
agreements committed potential purchasers to acquire Marshall Field shares only with the
company's approval. See id. In exchange for the commitments, Marshall Field disclosed con-
fidential information to the potential investors on which to base their bids. See id.
Icahn charged that the agreements with BATUS and the other potential bidders im-
properly interfered with the market for Marshall Field shares. See [1982 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. 98,616, at 93,060. Icahn alleged that Marshall Field's activities con-
stituted a manipulative practice in violation of § 14(e) of the '34 Act. See id.; 15 U.S.C. §
78n(e) (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
4 See [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 98,616, at 93,061.
148 See id. The court in Marshall Field indicated that target management is entrusted
with authority to oppose acquisitions which it believes in good faith to be contrary to the in-
terests of the shareholders. See id.; text accompanying notes 132-40.
149 See id.; note 195 infra.
, See Nathan, Corporate Stock Repurchases and Stock Issuance in the Context of Un-
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limit its rights in the target stock. 5' The agreements typically restrict
the bidder's ability to purchase additional shares in the target
company. 52 The purchase limitation may take the form of a compact by a
bidder to confine its bid to a friendly tender offer.'53 The target manage-
ment thus may protect the company from a hostile takeover should the
target's directors reject the bidder's proposed tender offer.'54 The stand-
still agreement also may restrict the bidder's right to buy additional
shares following completion of a tender offer. 5 Thus, the standstill may
serve to allow the target's directors the opportunity to decide whether
additional purchases are in the remaining shareholders' best interest. 5'
In addition to the purchase limitation, the standstill agreement also may
govern the acquired stock's voting rights'57 or condition the bidder's
solicited Takeover Bids, in PLI, ELEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION
289, 342-43 (A. Fleischer & M. Lipton eds. 1979) (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 319) [hereinafter cited as Stock Issuance]. See generally Bialkin, The
Use of Standstill Agreements in Corporate Transactions, in PLI, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL IN-
STITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 91 (A. Fleischer, M. Lipton & R. Mundheim eds. 1981)
(PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 373) [hereinafter cited as
Standstill Agreements]; A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES & PLANNING
64-65 (1981 ed.); Freund & Volk, supra note 6, at 22-23.
"' See Standstill Agreements, supra note 150, at 93; Stock Issuance, supra note 150, at
354-58. Standstill agreements may arise in the context of multistep acquisitions in several
circumstances. Before commencing serious takeover discussions, negotiating parties often
execute a confidentiality agreement to promote the flow of information about each company
to aid in the evaluation process. See Standstill Agreements, supra note 150, at 94. Confiden-
tiality agreements frequently contain standstill provisions to prevent the bidder from pur-
chasing target shares without target approval. See id. at 95. During the first step of
negotiating acquisition of a block of target shares, the target company or selling
shareholder may convince the bidder to stall its takeover efforts or forego the acquisition
attempt and adopt a more passive status as a minority investor. See Stock Issuance, supra
note 150, at 342-43. The standstill agreement also may serve as a means of defeating an un-
solicited takeover bid by placing target shares with a more suitable investor under the
restriction that the friendly bidder remain a minority shareholder. See Standstill
Agreements, supra note 150, at 96; Stock Issuance, supra note 150, at 342. In addition to
multistep acquisitions, standstill agreements may appear in other contexts. Standstill
agreements may restrict a corporation launching a minority investment program of direct
investment in other companies to the passive role of minority shareholder. See Stock Is-
suance, supra note 150, at 342. Additionally, courts may impose standstill agreements on
parties in resolving litigation between a bidder and a target. See Standstill Agreements,
supra note 150, at 102-06.
"' See Standstill Agreements, supra note 150, at 93; Stock Issuance, supra note 150, at
354. Standstill agreements usually take the form of a provision included in a stock purchase
agreement to restrict the bidder's purchases to a specified percentage of the target's shares
unless the target management approves of additional purchases. See Stock Issuance, supra
note 150, at 354.
See Conoco, Inc. v. Seagram Co. Ltd., 517 F. Supp. 1299, 1301 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(description of Seagram's agreement to limit itself to friendly bid); text accompanying notes
160-92 infra.
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disposal of any shares on a right of the remaining shareholder's first
refusal.'
In a case stemming from the largest corporate takeover in United
States history,159 the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York considered the enforceability of a standstill agree-
ment in Conoco Inc. v. Seagram Co. 6 ° Under the agreement, the
Seagram Company Ltd. (Seagram) promised to limit its bid for shares of
Conoco Inc. (Conoco) to a friendly tender offer. 6 ' The dispute arose
because of Conoco's efforts to resist a takeover bid by Dome Petroleum
Ltd. (Dome).'62 In seeking to rebuff Dome's takeover attempt, Conoco
turned to other potential bidders in search of a white knight."3 In the
course of negotiations, Seagram proposed what it termed a "friendly"
tender offer.'64 Seagram agreed to subject its proposed acquisition of 35
percent of Conoco stock to a standstill agreement that would require
Seagram to drop its takeover bid should the negotiations fail.6 5 The
agreement obligated Seagram to vote the acquired shares only in accord
with Conoco's management, to limit its holdings to the 35 percent, and to
transfer its shares only with Conoco's approval.'66 Meanwhile, Conoco
engaged in negotiations with Cities Service Company (Cities Service)
concerning the possibility of a merger. 7 Allegedly relying on the stand-
still provision limiting Seagram to a friendly takeover offer, Conoco's
board of directors decided to reject Seagram's proposal.'68 On the same
day that Conoco and Cities Service agreed in principle to merge,
Seagram launched a hostile tender offer for up to 40 percent of Conoco's
stock.'69 As a result, Cities Service withdrew from negotiations concern-
ing the proposed merger with Conoco."7 °
" See id. Providing a right of first refusal on shares purchased under a standstill
agreement allows the target to assure itself that the shares will not fall into the hands of an
unfriendly purchaser or one that may present antitrust or other difficulties for the target.
See id. at 21. A bidder that fears losing a bidding contest has a strong incentive to limit the
standstill restrictions placed on the shares. See id. at 23-24. A bidder failing to complete a
takeover may face the unwanted prospect of being unable to sell the shares while remaining
confined in the shareholder rights exercisable under the standstill agreement. See id.
'5' See Deals of the Year, FORTUNE, Jan. 25, 1982, at 36.
5" 517 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
... See id.
16' See id. at 1301. On May 6, 1981, Dome Petroleum Ltd. (Dome) began a tender offer
for 20% of the common stock of Conoco Inc. (Conoco) with the intent of exchanging the




" See Brill, Conoco: Great Plays & Errors in the Bar's World Series, Am. Law., Nov.
1981, at 39, 43.
'5. See 517 F. Supp. at 1301.
'5 See id.
"' See id. In its initial public tender offer, Seagram proposed to purchase up to 40% of




Contending that the standstill agreement should estop Seagram's
bid, Conoco requested a preliminary injunction against Seagram's
tender offer.' Conoco 'maintained that the directors entered into
merger negotiations with Cities Service in reliance on Seagram's agree-
ment not to make an unfriendly offer for Conoco's stock."' Conoco con-
tended Seagram's announcement of a hostile tender offer deprived Con-
oco's shareholders of the benefit of a merger with Cities Service.' Con-
oco also sought to enforce the restrictive provisions of the standstill
agreement to limit Seagram's acquisitions of Conoco stock."4
Disputing Conoco's charges, Seagram asserted that the standstill
provisions applied only during the period of merger negotiations with
Conoco. 1' 5 When Conoco broke off the negotiations, Seagram argued it no
longer was obligated to abide by the friendly takeover limitation.'
Moreover, Seagram submitted that in agreeing to the standstill provi-
sions, Seagram relied on Conoco's good faith in the negotiations. 7
Seagram claimed that Conoco acted in bad faith by concealing the
simultaneous negotiations with Cities Service, and hence, Conoco lacked
the clean hands necessary to merit equitable relief.' Conoco responded
that Seagram was aware Conoco was engaged in other takeover negotia-
tions, although Seagram did not know with whom. 7 9
An essential element of any claim for injunctive relief is proof that
the party seeking the injunction will be injured irreparably if the relief
is denied."' In its Conoco opinion, the district court focused its attention
on Conoco's failure to establish irreparable harm."' Although Seagram's
hostile bid arguably deprived Conoco shareholders of the Cities Service
deal, Conoco quickly became the subject of a more generous tender offer
by E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Du Pont)"2 and an escalated offer by
"' See id. at 1300.








18' See id. See also Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co. v. Costle, 632 F.2d 1014, 1017 (2d
Cir.), cert denied, 450 U.S. 996 (1981); Jack Kahn Music Co. v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co.,
604 F.2d 755, 758 (2d Cir. 1979); Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Tiger Int'l Inc., 600 F.2d
355, 359 (2d Cir. 1979).
"' See 517 F. Supp. at 1302-04. Because the district court in Conoco based its decision
on the irreparable injury component of its preliminary injunction claim, the court avoided
addressing Conoco's probability of success on the merits. See id. at 1302-03.
," See id. On July 5, 1981, E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Du Pont) made a tender of-
fer to purchase up to 100% of Conoco's stock. See id. at 1300. Under the offer, Du Pont of-
fered to buy 40% of Conoco's shares at $87.50 per share and exchange 1.6 Du Pont shares
for each share of the balance of Conoco stock. See id. Du Pont later increased its offer to $95
per Conoco share and proposed an exchange of 1.7 Du Pont shares for each of the remaining
Conoco shares. See id. at 1303 n.3.
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Seagram.' 3 The court rejected Conoco's contention that Seagram's
hostile bid endangered Du Pont's tender offer,'84 stating that the argu-
ment amounted to a claim that Conoco's directors simply preferred Du
Pont's offer.1
5
In discussing the Conoco directors' right to enter into the standstill
agreement with Seagram, the court subtly shifted focus from the ir-
reparable injury issue to the broader policy question whether directors
or shareholders should determine which tender offer to accept.'8 6 The
court reasoned that although directors are obligated to apply their best
business judgment in responding to a takeover attempt, their opinion is
not binding on the shareholders.'87 The court stated that the ultimate
decision whether to accept Seagram's or Du Pont's tender offer rested
with the shareholders, not management. '88 Even without relying on
Seagram's charge that Conoco dealt in bad faith, the court disregarded
Conoco's estoppel claim because enforcing the standstill agreement
would have deprived Conoco shareholders of an alternative to Du Pont's
bid.188 Furthermore, after rejecting Conoco's irreparable injury claim,
the court denied Conoco's likelihood of success on the merits.' 8 The
court believed that the factual controversy over Conoco's good faith
prevented Conoco from succeeding in its proof that the Seagram tender
offer precluded its proposed merger with Cities Service.8 ' The court
held that the balance of equities tipped in favor of the Conoco
shareholders, whom the court determined should not be denied the op-
tion of accepting alternatives to Du Pont's tender offer.'8 '
In its broadest terms, Conoco represents the policy determination
that corporate directors should not be allowed to contract away the
right of shareholders to consider takeover bids that target management
opposes.' 3 Conoco implies that target management may never exercise
"' See id. at 1303. In a second tender offer in Conoco, Seagram upgraded its initial
offer of $73 per Conoco share to $85 per share of Conoco common. See id.
"' See id. at 1302-03. In Conoco, Conoco based its argument that Seagram's hostile
tender offer threatened the Du Pont deal on the fear that Seagram's bid might preclude the




'8 See id.; note 195 infra.
188 See 517 F. Supp. at 1302-03. See also American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-
American Sugar Co., 276 F. Supp. 45, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
,"' See 517 F. Supp. at 1303. See also Armour & Co. v. General Host Corp., 296 F. Supp.
470, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
'" See 517 F. Supp. at 1304.
' See id.
2 See id.
,83 Most forms of corporate acquisitions, including statutory mergers and sales of cor-
porate assets, involve an initial decision by the board of directors whether to proceed with
the deal. See Perlmutter, supra note 139, at 18. To the extent that responses to a takeover
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its business judgment to secure a standstill agreement committing a
potential bidder not to launch a tender offer, even when the board of
directors has concluded that a hostile tender offer would adversely af-
fect the shareholder's best interests.194 The court's opinion, however, of-
fers little to support placing tighter restrictions on the directors' ability
to enter into contracts on behalf of the company than are already em-
bodied in management's fiduciary obligations under state law.19 Anyone
entering the securities market entrusts corporate leadership with the
duty to make decisions that in its best business judgment199 will enhance
the profitability of the company's stock. 97 So long as the directors' fidelity
to the shareholders remains steadfast, management should remain free
to represent investors in corporate negotiations. 199
The greater scrutiny courts have applied in examining multistep ac-
quisition techniques ultimately focuses on whether protection of
shareholders confronted with a takeover attempt should derive from
federal or state law, and more fundamentally, whether shareholders or
directors should determine the proper response to a bidder's acquisition
efforts. The Williams Act provisions should continue to provide
shareholder protection in the form of full and fair disclosure. 99 Because
attempt differ only in form rather than substance from other corporate decisions, target
directors should be free to enter into standstill agreements. See id.; note 139 supra.
Moreover, the decision to enter into a standstill agreement differs little from other target
defensive tactics in which the shareholder is entitled to little or no voice. See Fischel, supra
note 1, at 42.
"' Letter from Russell H. Beatie, Jr., of Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood,
counsel for Conoco, to Judge Edward Weinfeld (July 15, 1981) at 4 (on file with the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York).
"I A target's decision whether to engage in a particular defensive tactic to thwart a
hostile bidder is subject to the same state fiduciary standards imposed on corporate direc-
tors in other management decisions. See Bialkin, supra note 79, at 27. While directors are
obligated to uphold strict fiduciary standards, management decisions are entitled to
deference under the business judgment rule. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids,
Defensive Tactics, and Shareholder's Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733, 1745 (1981). The basic
theory supporting the business judgment rule is that corporate directors, not courts, are in
the best position to make business decisions that enhance shareholder interests. See id. To
avoid second-guessing management, courts apply a presumption in favor of management's
business decisions. See id. A party challenging management's choice of a defensive tactic
has the burden of proving that the target directors acted in bad faith or served their own in-
terests in the transaction. See Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381 (2d Cir.
1980). See generally Lipton, supra note 139; Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Board-
room: An Update After One Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017 (1981); Note, Tender Offers: Standing
to Sue, Prohibited Practices, Reliance on Non-Tenderer, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 930, 939
n.73 (1980).
19 See note 195 supra.
"17 Given their access to corporate information and generally superior business ex-
perience, target directors are usually in a much better position to assess the merits of an ac-
quisition attempt than are ordinary shareholders. See Perlmutter, supra note 139, at 18.
" See note 193 supra.
"9 See text accompanying notes 23-35 supra.
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the current bifurcated disclosure provisions adequately protect in-
vestors, federal courts should resist attempts by creeping tender offer
proponents to extend tender offer requirements to open market and
privately negotiated transactions. 0 While federal securities laws assure
proper disclosure of acquisition attempts, state fiduciary standards
should constitute the primary source of substantive takeover
safeguards. ' When confronted with a hostile tender offer, target
management should be free to attract more favorable bids by
negotiating agreements designed to lock up the target's acquisition by a
preferred bidder.0 2 Similarly, federal securities laws should not restrict
target management's ability to enter into standstill agreements limiting
a bidder's rights in the target stock if management concludes the
takeover attempt would be detrimental to the target shareholders. 3
Provided target management upholds its fiduciary obligations,
shareholders should entrust target directors with the authority to act on
their behalf in furthering the best interests of the company.0 4
GAINES H. CLEVELAND
See notes 37-72 supra.
OCI See note 195 supra.
See notes 83-140 supra.
See notes 159-92 supra.
See text accompanying notes 196-98 supra.
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